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I. INTRODUCTION
We hold this truth to be self-evident': we live in a digital age. A person
would be hard-pressed to walk down a crowded city block without seeing a
single soul talking on a cell phone2 , listening to music on an iPod', or catching
up on some reading on a Kindle.' In the last fifteen years, the public has wit-
nessed an explosion of communications and media devices into the market.'
These products mobilize users and free them of the tethers of desktop com-
puters and landline telephones. The widespread use of such devices has sig-
naled a dramatic shift in the day-to-day operations of the workplace, vastly
increasing efficiency and allowing employers increased freedom. 6 However,
Carolyn would like to thank her fianc6, Richard Ward, for always being an unwaver-
ing source of encouragement and inspiration. She would also like to thank her parents,
Gregory and Laura Coda, who are the best role models any child could imagine. Lastly, she
would like to specially thank the editors and associates of COMMLAW CONSPECTUS Volumes
18 and 19 for giving her the opportunity to share her writing.
I THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. I (U.S. 1776).
2 Tim Stevens, 82% of Americans Own Cell Phones, SWITCHED (Nov. 14, 2007, 11:22
AM), http://www.switched.com/2007/11/14/82-of-americans-own-cell-phones.
3 IT Facts, http://www.itfacts.biz/34-of-american-adults-own-an-mp3-player/ 11637
(last visited Jan. 1, 2011).
4 Lance Whitney, E-book Readers Still Owned By Small Niche, CNET NEWS (Sept. 11,
2009, 12:31 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10350878-93.html.
5 Lance Whitney, Cell Phone Subscriptions to Hit 5 Billion Globally, CNET NEWS
(Feb. 16, 2010, 8:28 AM), http://reviews.cnet.com/8301-13970 7-10454065-78.html.
6 See Anthony M. Townsend, et al., Virtual Teams: Technology and the Workplace of
the Future, ACAD. OF MGMT. EXEC., Aug. 1998, at 17.
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such freedom inevitably comes with a price.
Employers in the United States currently spend 59 billion dollars on plans
and devices that enable their employees to communicate with one another.'
Thus, employers have an interest in maintaining control over how each device
is used, broadening the supervisory role of the employer to include the moni-
toring of employee communications on employer-issued devices. In today's
hyper-socialized society, it is inevitable that employees will step outside the
lines of a device's permitted purpose and use them for personal reasons. In
light of these circumstances, questions arise as to whether or not an employer
can lawfully monitor the actions of their employees on the issued device and, if
so, what notice is required to adequately inform the employee. In June 2010,
the Supreme Court of the United States promulgated a response to an integral
piece of this very inquiry, albeit in a narrow context.8
On December 14, 2009, the Court granted the petition for writ of certiorari
in City of Ontario v. Quon,' a case from the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit. Sergeant Jeffrey Quon, a member of the City of Ontario's
SWAT team, filed a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983,0 alleging a Fourth
Amendment" violation when his superiors reviewed the transcripts of text
messages that he had been sending on his employer issued 2 two-way pager."
Joining him in his suit were the people with whom he exchanged the majority
of his text messages: his wife, Jerilyn Quon; a SWAT team dispatcher, April
Florio, with whom he was romantically involved; and another SWAT team
member, Steven Trujillo.14 In an exercise of judicial discretion, the Supreme
Court did not consider two of the three major issues that were reviewed in the
lower courts-the Stored Communications Act," and qualified immunity" -
7 Martin Vaughan & Amol Sharma, Tax Man's Target: The Mobile Phone, WALL ST.
J., June 12, 2009, at Al.
City of Ontario v. Quon (Quon Ill), 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
9 City of Ontario v. Quon, 554 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 78 U.S.L.W.
55282 (U.S. Dec. 14, 2009) (No. 07-55282), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Quon III, 130 S.
Ct. 2619.
1o 42 U.S.C § 1983 (2006).
" U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.").
12 Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc. (Quon II), 529 F.3d 892, 895 (9th Cir.
2008).
13 Paging Systems, BITPIPE.coM, http://www.bitpipe.com/tlist/Paging-Systems.html (last
visited Jan. 1, 2011) ("A two-way pager ... allows you to send data as well as receive it.
Some two-way pagers can handle alphanumericinput [sic] and display and can send and
receive e-mail and SMS messages").
14 Quon II, 529 F.3d at 895.
15 Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (1986).
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and instead focused solely on the allegation that the appellee's employer vio-
lated the appellant's Fourth Amendment rights."
The Court's decision will surely have wide-ranging implications in the fields
of communications, labor, and employment law. Considered a "new frontier in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that has little been explored,"" the Court
dipped their proverbial toes into the sea of electronic communications, issuing
a ruling that although did not create black letter law, will shape laws governing
the ever-expanding world of electronic communications. This note will first
focus on a substantive analysis of the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Quon v. Arch
Wireless Operating Company,19 chronicling the pathway that was forged by the
lower courts leading to the Supreme Court. Next, the note explores the merits
and weakness of each parties' claims, in light of the spectrum of related case
law. Then, the note will look at both the oral arguments given by the relevant
counsels before the Supreme Court and the unanimous ruling that was eventu-
ally issued. Lastly, this note will detail the applicability of the ruling to the
workplace and the various implications it will have for the functional opera-
tions that occur when an employer chooses to issue a communications device
to his employees.
II. SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS OF QUON V. CITY OF ONTARIO
A. Factual Background
In October 2001, the City of Ontario ("City") entered into a contract with
Arch Wireless Operating Company ("Arch Wireless") for wireless text-
messaging services for its employees that limited the per-month character al-
lotment for each device.20 The City of Ontario Police Department ("OPD")
issued pagers to its SWAT team members to facilitate mobilization and re-
sponse to emergency situations.2' Since late 1999, the City employed a com-
puter privacy policy that governed appropriate employee use of communica-
tions over city-owned computers and gave OPD the right to monitor communi-
16 Cf Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) ("Government officials . .. gener-
ally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known").
17 See U.S. CoNsT., supra note 11.
18 Quon II, 529 F.3d at 904.
19 Id. at 892.
20 Quon II, 529 F.3d at 897.
21 Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc. (Quon 1), 445 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1122
(C.D. Cal. 2006) (noting that the primary reason for the pagers was to "enable better coordi-
nation and a more rapid and effective response to emergencies").
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cations without prior notice.2 2 The policy generally prohibited the employees
from using the regulated devices for non-work related purposes, with a caveat
that allowed for "light personal use". 23 A few months after implementation of
the Policy, in early 2000, Jeffrey Quon and Steven Trujillo each signed an ac-
knowledgement of the Policy, as required for their employment as members of
the City's SWAT team.24 Although the policy did not expressly apply to text
messages over mobile devices, OPD informed its employees that it would treat
text messages over employer-issued devices according to the policy. At a
meeting in April 2002, at which Quon was present, Lieutenant Steven Duke
stated that the messages that are sent via the pagers were to be characterized
the same way as those sent via computers and therefore would "fall under the
City's policy as public information and would be eligible for auditing."25 Im-
mediately following the meeting, Police Chief Lloyd Scharf, who had been in
attendance, drafted and sent a memo26 to the office reiterating in writing what
Duke had stated in the meeting.27 Quon and other employees of the SWAT
team received one of the two-way alphanumeric pagers.28
Beginning in April 2002, Quon exceeded the allowable character allotment
on his pager, and continued to do so for the next four months.29 At the end of
22 Quon II 529 F.3d at 896. The Policy provided: "[T]he use of City-owned computers
and all associated equipment, software, programs, networks, Internet, e-mail and other sys-
tems operating on these computers is limited to City of Ontario related business. The use of
these tools for personal benefit is a significant violation of City of Ontario policy." Id.
The Policy also provided:
[a]ccess to all sites on the Internet is recorded and will be periodically reviews by the
City. The City of Ontario reserves the right to monitor and log all network activity, in-
cluding e-mail and Intemet use, with or without notice. Users should have no expecta-
tion of privacy or confidentiality when using these resources. Access to the Internet and
e-mail system is not confidential; and information produced either in hard copy or elec-
tronic form is considered City property. As such, these systems should not be used for
personal or confidential communications. Deletion of e-mail or other information may
not fully delete the information from the system. The use of inappropriate, derogatory,
obscene, suggestive, defamatory, or harassing language in the e-mail system will not be
tolerated.
Id.
23 Id. (The Policy allowed for "some incidental and occasional personal use of the e-
mail system" which "may consist of personal greetings or person meetings arrangements.").
24 Id. at 896.
25 Id. at 896. Quon contests whether Duke phrased his comments in this exact manner.
Although Quon admits to attending the meeting, he stated that he only "vaguely" remem-
bered doing so and did not recall "at all" any comments made by Duke that would insinuate
that the pagers were under the same restrictions as computer usage. Id.
26 Id
27 Quon II, 529 F.3d at 896.
28 Id. at 895. A total of twenty-one two-way pagers were issued at the time that Quon
received one. Id
29 Id.
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each month, Duke would contact Quon and inform him of his overages.30 Ac-
cording to Quon, Duke never threatened the possibility of an audit and permit-
ted officers who exceeded their allotment to pay "if [they] don't want the On-
tario Police Department to read [the messages]."" In this way, Duke created an
informal policy that allowed employees to submit payment when they ex-
ceeded their monthly character allotment.32
Quon paid the overages every month until August 2002, when Quon once
again violated his 25,000-character allotment." Duke informed Chief Scharf
that he "was tired of being a bill collector,"34 to which Scharf demanded that he
"request the transcripts of the text messages for auditing purposes."" Signifi-
cantly, the purpose of the request was to conduct an audit to determine if
Quon's pager was used for business or personal use.36 If the messages con-
cerned business matters, the City would consider the possibility of contracting
for a higher character allotment.37 Duke received the transcripts from Arch
Wireless", reviewed the messages, and reported his findings to Scharf." Duke
concluded that Quon had "exceeded his monthly character allotment by 15,158
characters,"40 spurring an internal affairs investigation. 4 1 After an extensive
review of the transcripts of messages sent and received during business hours,
the Department concluded that Quon had violated official policy.42 The viola-
tion was based not only upon Quon's quantitative usage of his pager, but also
on the fact that many of the messages were sexually explicit and suggestive in
nature.43 McMahon reported his findings to Scharf, who in turn brought the
investigation to the attention of Quon.4 4 Quon, his wife J. Quon, Florio, and
30 Id.
3' Quon II, 529 F.3d at 897.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
3 Id. at 897-98.
36 Quon I, 529 F.3d at 898.
3 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Quon I, 529 F.3d at 898.
42 Brief of Petitioners at 8, City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S., 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010)
(No. 08-1332). (The investigation found that Quon had sent "a total of 456 personal trans-
missions during his normally scheduled workdays for the month of August 2002" and that
"on average, Quon would send and receive 28 transmissions during his normally scheduled
shift," including that "only three would be business related and the rest would be non-work
related.").
43 Id. at 8-9. Many of the messages were sent to the other parties of the suit, including
Jerilyn Quon (Quon's wife), April Florio (Quon's mistress), and fellow SWAT team mem-
ber Steven Trujillo. Id.
4 Quon I, 445F. Supp. 2d at I127.
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Trujillo sued the City, the Ontario Police Department, Chief Scharf, and an-
other member of the Department's Internal Affairs department,45 claiming vio-
lations of the Fourth Amendment,46 article I, section I of the California Consti-
tution 47 ; and the Stored Communications Act.48
B. Procedural Background
1. The District Court-A Victory for the City
Each side filed cross motions for summary judgment.49 The district court
maintained that in order for a Fourth Amendment violation to be sustained, the
plaintiffs needed to show that a reasonable expectation of privacy existed in
the text messages that were sent on the pagers and that the search of the text
messages was unreasonable."o The district court relied on the framework pro-
vided by the O'Connor v. Ortega plurality to determine that a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy existed in the content of messages." Under this analytical
framework, any determination of whether a public employee has a legitimate
expectation of privacy must consider "the operational realities of the work-
place" to determine if the Fourth Amendment is implicated.52 The Court ruled
that the informal agreement between Lieutenant Drake and the SWAT team
members to pay for overages "fundamentally transformed" such operational
realities, giving the SWAT team members a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the messages.5
After determining that Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
text messages on his city-issued pager, the Court had to decide whether the
audit of the messages was "reasonable under the circumstances."54 Whether or
not the audit was reasonable depended on Scharf's purpose for initiating the
audit. The court found that the reason for the search of the messages, which
Scharf claimed was to determine if the messages were personal in nature," was
45 Id at 1128.
46 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
47 Cal. Const. art. I, § 1 ("All people are by nature free and independent and have inal-
ienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending ... privacy.").
48 See Stored Communications Act, supra note 15.
49 See generally Quon 1, 445 F. Supp. 2d 1116. The district court denied the plaintiffs'
summary judgment. The defendants were granted summary judgment in party and denied in
part. Id.
50 Id. at 1139-46.
5' Id at 1143.
52 Id.
5 Quon 1, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 1141.
54 Id at 1144.
55 Id.
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an issue of material fact and ordered a jury trial to determine intent." The jury
found that Scharf had a legitimate purpose for initiating the audit, rendering the
defendants not liable for the review of the text messages." The plaintiffs im-
mediately appealed the ruling."
2. The Ninth Circuit rules in favor of Quon
The Ninth Circuit" reviewed the case and ruled on whether the Arch Wire-
less agreement violated the Stored Communications Act; whether the City,
Department, and Scharf violated Quon's rights and the rights of the recipients
of the messages under the Fourth Amendment and the California Constitution;
and whether Scharf was entitled to the protections of qualified immunity."o The
Circuit Court reversed the lower court's decision, finding that Quon's constitu-
tional rights had been violated when his text messages were reviewed without
consent." Citing O'Connor v. Ortega6 as support, the court analyzed the con-
stitutional issue in two prongs: first, whether appellants had a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in the text messages; and second, whether the search per-
formed by the Department was reasonable in scope."
56 Brief of Petitioners, supra note 42, at 10. If Scharfs intent was to ensure that City
employees were not being forced to pay for work-related overages, the search would be
considered reasonable. However, if the jury found that Scarf's intent was to make sure that
City employee's were not "wasting time" or "playing games" the search would be found to
be unreasonable. Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 11. The plaintiffs appealed challenging the ruling and that their motion for
summary judgment should not have been denied. To counter, the defendant's countered that
the ruling should be affirmed and with the assertion that their motion for summary judgment
should have been granted because "as a matter of law, plaintiffs had no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy and the review of the pager transcripts was reasonable under either purpose
submitted to the jury." Brief of Petitioners, supra note 42, at 10.
5 The United States Courts for the Ninth Circuit, http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov (last
visited Jan. 1, 2011). The Ninth Circuit has a slightly different process than most courts and
instead of having a single judge preside over the case, a panel consisting of three judges
makes the ruling. Id.
60 For purposes of this note, only the Fourth Amendment claim will be reviewed. As
such, the Ninth Circuit determined "[tlhe 'privacy' protected by the California Constitution
is no broader in the area of search and seizure . . . protected by the Fourth Amendment ...
[and so] [a]ccordingly our analysis proceeds under the Fourth Amendment." Quon II, 529
F.3d at 903.
61 Id. at 911.
62 See generally O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987). In O'Connor, a state hospi-
tal employed Ortega and searched his office investigating a sexual harassment claim, which
lead to Ortega's termination. Ortega argued the search violated his Fourth Amendment
rights. The Court found Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his tangible
workspace and the search performed by the hospital was unreasonable in its scope and in-
ception. Id. at 1495-96, 1498.
63 Id. (O'Connor's test goes further than its two prongs and suggest that not only must
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In its analysis of the first prong, the court delved into the area of law that
dictates how much privacy an individual should expect when using employer-
issued devices, which is one that has yet to take concrete form.' Because of
this fact, the analogy was made to other forms of communications, including e-
mails, phone calls and letters." Using case law that spanned nearly forty
years", the court determined that like senders of the aforementioned communi-
cations, Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of the text
messages he sent on his pager." The Court pinpointed the informal policy,
which allowed Quon to pay for his overages as a way of avoiding audit, as the
genesis of his expectation of privacy." Although the court recognized that a
formal policy was in place that strictly forbade the use of computers and re-
lated tools for personal reasons, it found instructive the factual events that sur-
rounded the interactions between Duke, the "bill-collector," and Quon. The
court ultimately determined that Quon's reliance on the informal policy estab-
lished by Duke trumped any implications made by the formal counterpart.69
When determining the hierarchy of the policies, the court introduced the con-
cept of the "operational reality" of a workplace, which reviews all of the cir-
cumstances that surround the issue being analyzed and adduces, sometimes
regardless of formal policy, how employees view that issue." In this instance,
the Court found Quon's reliance on the informal policy persuasive, factoring in
that before the audit in question occurred, there had not been a similar investi-
gation for the duration of time since the pagers had been issued." The court
also viewed Quon's repeated violation of the 25,000-character allotment with-
out incurring an audit as support for the "operational reality" that the informal
policy was the controlling policy with the Department. 2
Controversially, the Ninth Circuit allegedly broke from its sister circuits73
the search be reasonable in scope, but it must be "justified at its inception" and must be
"reasonable related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place").
64 Quon II, 529 F.3d at 903.
65 Quon I, 529 F.3d at 904-06.
66 Id. at 904-907.
67 Id at 905.
68 Id at 907.
69 Id
70 O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). (The concept of
the workplace operational reality was first introduced in O'Connor v. Ortega. in his dissent,
Judge Blackmun noted that "in certain situations, the 'operational realities' of the workplace
may remove some expectation of privacy on the party of the employee").
7' Quon II, 529 F.3d at 907.
72 Id.
73 Brief of Petitioners, supra note 42, at 47-48. (Brief describes a litany of cases that
support the disallowance of a less intrusive means including: Bd. Of Educ. Of Indep. Sch.
Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomemie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 837 (2002) [suspicionless
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and ruled that the search performed by the Department was unreasonable at its
inception, primarily due to the assumptions that a "less intrusive means" of
determining the efficacy of the text messages was available to Scharf.74
Applying the district court's jury finding that the primary purpose of
Scharf's search was "determining the efficacy of the existing character limits
to ensure that officers were not being required to pay for their work,"" the
court admitted that requesting the transcripts without Quon's consent was a
reasonable means to meet those ends." However, the court reasoned that the
search ran contrary to the O'Connor standard" and was not reasonable in
scope." The court drew a parallel between Quon's case and Schowengerdt v.
General Dynamic Corp79, which held that if there was a less intrusive means
by which to obtain the information being sought by the employer, those means
must be utilized over any other methodology.o Interestingly, the court rejected
the lower court's assertion that Scharf's request of the transcript was the only
reliable way by which to determine the nature of the text messages sent by
Quon."' Instead they remarked that Scharf could have sought Quon's consent
to review the messages or could have put Quon on instructive warning that the
following month all messages would be reviewed." The court viewed the re-
quest as the linchpin of the appellant's case, and found a violation of Quon's
Fourth Amendment protections."
Furthermore, the court ruled that Quon's text message partners, Jerilyn
Quon, April Florio, and Steve Trujillo, had also been deprived of their Fourth
Amendment rights.84 Despite the fact that each individual knowingly sent text
messages to an employer-issued pager," the court reasoned that each had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the messages, validating the belief that
urinalysis of students participating in competitive extracurricular]; Skinner v. Ry Labor
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 629 .9 (1989) [drug and alcohol testing of railroad em-
ployees]; Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. at 646, 663 (2002) [random urinalysis
testing of student athletes]; United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 521, 542
(1985) [16-hour detention of suspected alimentary canal smuggler by customs official];
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-687 (1985) [20 minute-Terry stop of pickup
truck diver by DEA agent]).
74 Id
" Quon II, 529 F.3d at 908.
76 Id.
n Id. at 908-909.
78 Id. at 908.
7 Showengerdt v. General Dynamic Corp., 823 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1987).
80 Id. at 1336.
81 Quon II, 529 F.3d at 909.
82 Id
83 Id
84 Id
85 Id
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they would not be reviewed without consent."
3. Petition for rehearing en banc denied-The Judge Ikuta versus Judge
Wardlaw showdown
The foreshadowing of the showdown that took place when the Supreme
Court heard arguments in the spring can be found in the opinion and dissent for
the denial of the appellees' petition for a rehearing." Both Judge Wardlaw and
Judge Ikuta wrote impassioned responses to the denial, the latter penning a
detailed dissent that was joined by six other judges analyzing the significant
flaws in the Ninth Circuit's ruling." Judge Ikuta challenged the crux of the
decision as it related to the Fourth Amendment violation claims,89 asserting a
misapplication of both of the O'Connor prongs by the circuit court. She further
noted that the newly minted standard set forth by the Ninth Circuit would cre-
ate major hurdles for public employers in conducting business within their of-
fices." Moreover, she asserted that the ruling was inconsistent with Supreme
Court precedent and sister circuit decisions."
Judge Ikuta reasoned that by determining that Quon and others had a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the text messages, the ruling ran counter to
the standard set forth in O'Connor.92 Her conclusions focused on one of the
cornerstones of the Supreme Court's ruling in that case, namely that the "op-
erational realities of the workplace" must be taken into consideration in the
application of the reasonableness of an employee's expectation of privacy." It
is in that argument that the judge found her strongest contentions, which was
the seminal debate during oral arguments before Justices during the final ar-
gument for Quon. Judge Ikuta contended that the operational reality of the
workplace in which Quon found himself was the exact opposite of what the
86 Id. at 909.
87 Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., 554 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2009) (The City
and the Department filed for a panel rehearing and a rehearing en banc asserting that: 1) the
court's finding that the Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages sent
on a government-issued device severely abrogated the "operation realities of the workplace"
O'Connor standard; 2) the court falsely extended Fourth Amendment protections to those
individuals who willingly and knowing sent explicit text messages to Quon's government-
issued device; 3) the court's reliance on "less intrusive means" analysis is in direct conflict
with the Supreme Court and other circuit court's "repeated rejection" of such a test.).
88 Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., 554 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 2009) (Ikuta,
J., dissenting).
89 Id. (Ikuta, J., dissenting).
90 Id. (Ikuta, J., dissenting).
91 Id. (Ikuta, J., dissenting).
92 Id. at 776 (Ikuta, J., dissenting).
93 Id. (Ikuta, J., dissenting).
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Ninth Circuit envisioned.94 She pointed out that it was not contested whether
the SWAT team members were aware of both the formal and informal policies
related to the various methods of communications afforded to them by the De-
partment." In addition, the state of California has in place a public records law,
which allows the public to access most police documents and mandates that the
Department disclose various documents." Meaning that at any time, however
unlikely, any member of the public may request transcripts of the very text
messages that have been the cause of the entire legal discourse." The plurality
in O'Connor clearly states that a court must view all of the circumstances that
surround an employer's search when determining that it was reasonable, in-
cluding whether or not the employer in question was a public or private en-
tity." Judge Ikuta refuted the notion that the conversations between Duke and
Quon were enough to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy.99 Judge
Ikuta logically concluded that a statement by a non-superior officer that he
would not audit another SWAT team member's messages if he paid for the
overages does not amount to enough to overcome the lessened expectation of
privacy that is supported by looking at a totality of the circumstances."
The opinion displays a strong difference in views of the Ninth Circuit's
original "application" of the less intrusive means test."o' Specifically, Judge
Wardlaw denied that the appellate court used the test, stating that the discus-
sion about "less intrusive means" focused on the jury trial's finding related to
Scharf's reasoning for conducting the search.'02 Judge Wardlaw maintained
that there is a stark distinction between mentioning a "less intrusive means
test" that could have been used by Scharf as a way to review the text message
and actually mandating the application of the test.'03 The judge's distinction
sought to fend off the allegations that the court's opinion splits with seven
other circuits and the Supreme Court, each of which has maintained that a less
intrusive means test should not be employed when analyzing the reasonable-
94 Id. at 776-77 (Ikuta, J., dissenting).
95 Id. at 776 (Ikuta, J., dissenting).
96 Id.; see CAL. Gov'T CODE § 6253(a) (West 2008) ("Public records are open to inspec-
tion by the public at all times during the office hours of the state of local agency and every
person has a right to inspect any public record.").
9 See Quon III, 554 F.3d at 776.
98 See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717-18 (1987).
99 See Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., 554 F.3d 769, 775 (9th Cir. 2009).
100 Id at 776-77.
101 Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., 529 F.3d 289, 909 (9th Cir. 2009). (In
regards to Scharf's decision to pull Quon's transcripts as a method to determine the efficacy
of the messages, the court stated "There were a host of simply ways to verify the efficacy of
the 25,000 character limited without intruding on Appellants' Fourth Amendment rights ...
.This was excessively intrusive in the light of the noninvestigatory object of the search").
102 See Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., 554 F.3d 769, 773 (9th Cir. 2009).
103 Id. at. 773.
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ness of any particular government activity as it related to the Fourth Amend-
ment.'" Judge Ikuta acquiesced and admitted that the circuit court did not "ex-
plicitly state" that it was implementing a less intrusive means test, but that it
nevertheless implicitly did so.'o In the end, Judge Wardlaw proved victorious
and the petitioner's request was denied.o6 Soon after, petitioners filed a writ of
certiorari to have the case heard before the Supreme Court, which was subse-
quently granted.
III. MERITS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE BRIEFS FILED WITH THE
SUPREME COURT
Before the Supreme Court heard oral arguments," each side filed briefs that
presented the merits of its case in a manner that transposed each Justice into
the minds of Quon and the other respondents. At issue was the crucial inquiry
as to whether, considering the circumstances, each plaintiff would have rea-
sonably believed that the messages that were sent on the pagers were "pri-
vate".' As the months passed, many believed that the petitioners possessed
the stronger argument."' It is no secret that if the average person went through
the same experience of the respondents, he would have the mindset that his
communications were not private from his superiors."o However, this is not a
case of the average person; indeed, this case settles upon a very narrow set of
facts and will likely apply to similarly narrow circumstances in the future."'
Some commentators pointed out that the Supreme Court could use this op-
portunity to address the very ambiguities within the current law that apply to
104 Id. at 778.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 769.
107 Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S., 130 S. Ct. 2619
(2010) (No. 08-1332).
100 Id. at 1-8.
109 Orin Kerr, Communicating with Those Who Have No Privacy Rights: The Hard
Question in City of Ontario v. Quon, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, Blog Archive, http://
http://volokh.com/2010/03/31/communicating-with-those-who-have-no-privacy-rights-the-
hard-question-in-city-of-ontario-v-quon (last visited Jan. 1, 2011).
110 Id
III See Orin Kerr, The Surprising Narrow Top-Side Merits Brief in City of Ontario v.
Quon, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 9, 2010, 7:29 PM),
http://volokh.com/2010/02/09/the-surprisingly-narrow-top-side-merits-brief-in-city-of-
ontario-v-quon (asserting the Court's decision has the possibility to not apply to all govern-
ment employees who send messages via employer issued devices but may only affect those
employees who are in a government workplace at which there is a formal policy that does
not, in writing, address the type of device that he or she used and who have been orally in-
formed that the policy does not cover that device).
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the use of employer-issued (both public and private) devices.112 Specifically,
the Court could definitively settle how future courts should apply the
O'Connor test when determining whether a violation of an employee's Fourth
Amendment rights has occurred."' Additionally, the legal community com-
mented that it would be beneficial to communications law and employment
law if the Court handed down a bright-line ruling on the application of a "less
intrusive means test", whether explicitly or implicitly. "4 The briefs that were
submitted by both sides offered up clues as to the strategy that each side would
eventually employ in the quest of securing victory for their clients.
A. Quon's Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Text Messages
It is well-established that in order to have a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in what is being searched, a person must have exhibited an actual (subjec-
tive) expectation of privacy, and that the expectation is one that society is pre-
pared to recognize as reasonable."' In the case of an employer-employee
search, a court must look at the totality of the circumstances and consider cer-
tain facts that paint the picture of the "operational reality" of the workplace, a
concept that has the power to change level of an employee's expectation of
privacy."'
Here, both sides used the concept of the operational reality of a workplace to
make their case. Quon asserted, victoriously so in the lower courts, that it was
the Department's "informal-but express and specific-policy and practices that
governed the use of the pagers.""' In essence, he argued that because he had
been operating under a certain assumption, however false it may have been, his
expectation of privacy was a reasonable one."' He also maintained that be-
cause there was no official policy that governed the use of the pagers,"' he was
reasonable in his belief that if he paid the overages that Duke requested, the
112 Id.
"3 Brief for the League of California Cities et al as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petition-
ers, Quon v. City of Ontario, 78 U.S.L.W. 3359 (May 29, 2009) (No. 08-1332) ("This
Court's opinion in O'Connor v. Ortega, because it was a plurality decision, left unresolved
the issues of the extend to which the "special needs" exception applies to government em-
ployees and the proper test to apply to work-related searches conduced by a government
employer.").
114 See Kerr, supra note 111.
"5 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
116 O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 707, 725-26 (1987) ("[P]ublic employer intrusions on
the constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees . . . should be
judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances.").
"7 Brief in Opposition of Respondents Jeff Quon, et. al, Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
529 F.3d. 892 (No. 08-1332).
118 Brief of Respondents at 5, Quon v. City of Ontario, No. 08-1332 (S. Ct. May 2010).
''9 Id.
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Department would conduct an internal audit of his communications.120
Alternatively, the petitioners claimed that under the same "totality of the cir-
cumstances" approach, the operational "reality" was that no member of the
SWAT team should have had any expectation of privacy.2 To argue their
case, they pointed to the formal policyl 22 that was in place at the Department
during the time that Quon illicitly used his pager. Further, they emphasized the
salient fact that Duke held a meeting that Quon attended at which the attendees
were specifically instructed to be of the mindset that the (then newly-issued
pagers) would be considered to be a "tool" that is bound by the restrictions of
the policy. 123 Petitioners poked holes in the assertion that any "informal" policy
that Duke created within the workplace in order to ease his day-to-day tasks
was not administratively binding,'24 and that it was a "professional courtesy"
that Duke extended to his fellow colleagues.' 25 The petitioners asserted that
that the respondents misconstrued Quon "pressing his luck" with this "profes-
sional courtesy" when forming the assumption that his actions were shielded
from review.'26 They contended that, even if Quon believed that he would not
be audited because of Duke's informal policy, he had no reason to believe that
he would not have been audited by his true superiors if they were to find out
about his overages.12
Nowhere in the record is there support that Duke held the "magic key" that
would unlock some sort of alternate policy that would allow Quon to enter into
a pattern of behavior so diametrically opposed to the policies that the Depart-
ment had in place.128 Petitioners claimed that Duke was simply the employee
who was tasked with the undesirable job of asking fellow colleagues to pay
overages when they violated the agreement of the 25,000-character allot-
ment.' 29 The petitioners vehemently stressed that he was not a policy-maker
nor was he of the level within the department that a person, like Quon, should
reasonably believe that he would be able to unilaterally create a certain sub-
policy that would trump a formal agreement and give Quon leeway to act in
the manner in which he did.'30 Duke's actions could have been construed sim-
ply as an act of kindness rather than anything else,"' allowing Quon to avoid
120 Id. at 20.
121 Brief of Petitioners, supra note 42, at 29.
122 Quon II, 529 F.3d at 896 (9th Cir. 2008).
123 Brief of Petitioners, supra note 42, at 33.
124 Id. at 41.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 42.
128 Brief of Petitioners, supra note 42, at 42.
129 Id. at 53.
130 Id. at 42.
'3 Id. at 41.
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the annoyance (and embarrassment) of an audit by paying overages; and that
ultimately it was a stretch to imagine that extending such a kindness created an
expectation of privacy that society would be willing to accept as legitimate.'
Petitioners also used the California Public Records Act'33 persuasively to es-
tablish that Quon had a diminished expectation of privacy. Although there is
nothing in the record to state that Quon had been formally introduced to the
statute, it is a widely-accepted doctrine within the ranks of government em-
ployees throughout the state.134 The fact that any member of the public, at any
time, could have requested the very same type of transcript that Scharf re-
quested, calls into question how reasonable Quon's belief was that his text
messages were for his eyes only. '" However, whether or not a private citizen
would actually request the transcripts of the text messages is an entirely differ-
ent question. Petitioners claimed that it is not far-fetched to think that members
of the community may want to know what public servants say to one another,
especially if it is at the time of an incident.'3 Respondents counter-argued that
the proper inquiry is not the possibility that a private citizen could request a
transcript of Quon's text messages at any time but rather the probability that
someone would do so.'"3 Respondents contended that the odds that someone
would actually demand such information from the government are so that slim
that this fact should not reduce any expectation of privacy. '
B. Application of the Less Intrusive Means Test
In this case, the controversy surrounding the "less intrusive means test" is
132 Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., 554 F.3d 769, 779 (9th Cir. 2009) (Ikuta,
J., dissenting).
133 Brief of Petitioners, supra note 42, at 35.
134 Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., 554 F.3d 769, 776 (9th Cir. 2009) (Ikuta,
J., dissenting) ("Government employees in California are well aware that every government
record is potentially discoverable at the mere request of a member of the public, and their
reasonable expectation of privacy in such public records is accordingly reduced.").
1 CPRA defines a public record as "any writing containing information relating to the
conduct of the public's business prepared, owned, used, or retained by any state or local
agency regardless of physical form or characteristics." CAL. Gov'T CODE § 6252(e) (West
2008).
136 Brief of Petitioners, supra note 42, at 47 ("The public legitimate interest in the iden-
tity and activities of its peace officer's is even greater than its interest in those of the average
public servant.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
'3 Brief of Respondents at 44-45, City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S., 130 S. Ct. 2619
(2010) (No. 08-1332).
'3 Brief in Opposition of Respondents Jeff Quon, et. al, Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
529 F.3d. 892 (No. 08-1332). ("There is no evidence before the court suggesting that CPRA
requests to the department are so widespread and so frequent as to constitute an open at-
mosphere so open to fellow employees or the public that no expectation of privacy is rea-
sonable.")
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not whether it is technically "appropriate" for such a standard to be applied,
but whether it was applied at all. With seven other circuits disallowing such a
methodology'" when evaluating workplace claims, a finding that the test was
applied would have severely weakened the petitioner's case.
Respondents, supported by Judge Wardlaw, asserted that the Ninth Circuit
did not apply such a test and that the outcome of the case would have been no
different if the court's suggestions for a "less intrusive method" of determining
the efficacy of the text message was ever mentioned.'40 They agreed with
Judge Wardlaw that the only reason the court stated such a litany of "other
ways" the Department could have utilized was "merely to illustrate the conclu-
sion that the search was 'excessively intrusive' under O'Connor."4' Respon-
dents did not need to debate the merits of whether or not there was a break
from the other circuits in the court's ruling because of the belief that the test
was, as a matter of fact, never employed.
The petitioners based their contention that the less intrusive means test was
used on a "substance over form" argument.'42 Admittedly, the lower court did
not explicitly apply such a test, yet in the end that implicitly is exactly what
they did.'43 To give force to the assertion, petitioners highlighted the fact that
six judges joined Judge Ikuta's assessment of the Ninth Circuit's application of
the test, which would indicate a divergence from previous jurisprudence. 144 The
petitioners also cited to Skinner, in which the Supreme Court elucidated why
the less intrusive means test should not be used in a situation similar to Quon's,
pointing out that it is a simple task for a judicial body to review decisions made
by someone else in the past.'45 This is exemplified by the circuit court's sug-
gestions as to how Scharf could have determined the nature of Quon's text
messages otherwise.'46 Yet it is far from settled that any of the proscribed
methods would have produced truthful information regarding the text messages
given the circumstances surrounding the events in question.1"' These methods
139 Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., 554 F.3d 769, 779 (9th Cir. 2009).
140 Brief of Respondents at 22-24,City of Ontario, No. 08-1332 (S. Ct. Feb. 2010).
141 Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., 554 F.3d 769, 773 (9th Cir. 2009).
142 Id. at 769, 779.
143 Brief of Petitioners, supra note 42, at 3.
144 Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., 554 F.3d 769, 776 (9th Cir. 2009) (J.
Ikuta dissenting).
145 Brief of Petitioners, supra note 42, at 21( "It is obvious to the logic of ... elaborate
less restrictive-alternate arguments could raise insuperable barriers to the exercise of virtu-
ally all search-and-seizure powers, because judges engaged in post hoc evaluations of gov-
ernment conduct can almost always imagine some alternative means by which the objectives
of the government might have been accomplished.").
146 Quon II, 529 F.3d at 909.
147 Quon I, 445 F.Supp.2d at 1125. The text messages were explicit in nature and were
evidence of an affair that Quon was having with Florio. The likelihood that Quon would
make a greater effort to keep these facts hidden from his superiors is quite high.
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did not remedy the past issue of noncompliance with the policy, both as to the
rules related to "non-personal use" of the communications devices and the ob-
scene nature of the texts.'48
C. Permissibility of the Search by an Employer
The plurality in O'Connor stated that given an employer's special needs, he
or she may conduct work-related workplace searches as long as they are rea-
sonable.'49 When analyzing whether or not a search is reasonable, the court
must determine if the search was 1) reasonable in scope and 2) reasonable at its
inception.'o
As discussed above, the district court instructed a jury to determine Scharf's
intent when he demanded a review of Quon's text messages."' Had the jury
determined that Scharf attempted to weed out those employees who were
"playing games" the jury would have found the search to be unreasonable.15 2
However, it was determined'53 that Scharf ordered the review to determine the
efficacy of the text messages and to ensure that people like Quon were not be-
ing forced to pay for "work-related expenses."'54
Petitioners first articulated in their appeal to the circuit court that even if re-
spondents had a reasonable expectation of privacy, the review of the transcripts
was lawful because, under the O'Connor standard, the search was justified at
its inception.' They pointed to the entrenched rule that "special needs" are
present in the context of government employment."' In the case of a public
employer, the court must take into consideration, under the totality of the cir-
cumstances, whether or not the government interests outweigh those of the
individual.' The petitioners claimed that the Ninth Circuit did not sufficiently
weigh Quon's interest in the text messages that he sent on a Department issued
148 Id. There is no reference in the records that any of Quon's superiors believes that the
messages, although possibly personal in nature and too frequent, would be sexually explic-
itly and implicate him in an extramarital affairs with another member of the SWAT team.
149 O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725-726 (1987).
150 Id. at 726.
'' Quon I, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 1125, 1144.
152 Id at 1125
'53 Id. at 1143-1144.
154 Id. at 1125.
15 Brief of Petitioners, supra note 42, at 47.
56 O'Connor, 480 US. at 732. (J. Scalia concurring.) ("[G]overnment searches to re-
trieve work-related materials or to investigate violations of workplace rules - searches of the
sort that are regarded as reasonable and normal in the private-employer context - do not
violate the Fourth Amendment").
15 Enquist v. Oregon Dep't. of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2151-52 (2008) ("The govern-
ment has a legitimate interest in promoting efficiency and integrity in the discharge of offi-
cial duties, and in maintaining proper discipline in the public service.").
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pager against the Department's "direct and overriding interest in ensuring that
the work of the agency is conducted in a proper and efficient manner.".. Fur-
thermore, they claimed that Scharf promoted one of the primary goals of the
police department, to maintain a solidified workforce that focuses on protect-
ing its citizens.'
D. Third Party's Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Text Messages
The respondents claimed that the Ninth Circuit's ruling that Steven Trujillo,
April Florio, and Jerilyn Quon all had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
their text messages to Quon is consistent with Supreme Court precedent and
should be affirmed.'60 The court analogized the text messages at issue to e-
mails that had been involved in a prior case that dealt with an employer
search."' There, the court determined that the sender of an e-mail had a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the content of the e-mails, but not in any in-
formation that was necessary to determine the recipient of the e-mail.162 Re-
spondents claimed that their expectation of privacy was based on the same in-
formal policy created by Duke, noting that all three of the additional respon-
dents worked for the SWAT team and were aware of the agreement between
Quon and Duke.' Consequently, they claimed that none of the additional re-
spondents would have any belief that the text messages that they sent to Quon
would be available for review. "
The petitioners were deeply concerned with the expansion of Fourth
Amendment protections to Trujillo, Florio and J. Quon."'' For each person,
they claimed that there could not have been any expectation of privacy in those
messages because they knowingly and willingly sent them to a pager that be-
longed to the Department.' Additionally, because Quon had consented to a
'5 Brief of Petitioners, supra note 42, at 45-46 (citing O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 724).
159 Brief of Petitioners, supra note 42, at 45-47.
160 Brief of Petitioners, supra note 42, at 19-24.
161 Quon II, 529 F.3d at 905 (discussing United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500 (9th
Cir. 2008)).
162 United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 509-10 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742, 745 (1979) (holding the government's warrantless use of pen
register to record the telephone numbers that one dials does not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment because people "realize they must convey phone numbers to a telephone company,
since it is through the telephone company switching the equipment that their calls are com-
pleted .... ).
163 Brief of Respondents at 24, City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010) (No. 08-
1332).
164 Id.
165 Brief of Petitioners, supra note 42, at 60-61.
166 Id. at 61-62 ("The Ninth Circuit opinion fails to account for the fact that the other
plaintiffs were fully aware that they were sending messages to Sergeant Quon's Depart-
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review of the messages, there could not have been an expectation of privacy."'
The petitioners believed that Quon consented when he signed the Policy and
noted that he was told both orally and in a non-signed statement that the policy
applied to the pagers."' Moreover, at the heart of the argument, insomuch that
Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy due to the alleged "operational
reality" created by Duke's actions, there is a failure to bridge the gap as to how
that could extend to the respondents who had little or no interaction with
Duke.' Petitioners also attempted to appeal to the common-sense beliefs of
society, remarking that the average person knows that most public employers
have no privacy policies' in place and that this is especially likely in the sce-
nario involving the policy force.'"'
IV. QUON COMES BEFORE THE COURT
A. Oral Arguments
When the Court finally heard oral arguments on April 19, 2010172 the scene
was one of acute questioning by the Justices regarding the applicability of the
basic Fourth Amendment rights to an individual's personal communications
blended with an obvious gap in understanding about the technological minutiae
of how modem electronic communications function. Poignantly, the Acting
Solicitor General argued on behalf of the United States for the Justices to exer-
cise restraint when analyzing such an unfamiliar set of circumstances, for fear
of creating black letter law that would be difficult to augment as the world of
ment-issued pager ....
167 Id. at 62-63.
168 Id. at 33, 64.
169 Brief of Respondents at 17, City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010) (No. 08-
1332); Brief of Petitioners at 62-63, City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010) (No.
08-1332).
170 Brief of Petitioners, supra note 42, at 21. In particular, "numerous government agen-
cies" like the City of Ontario, have adopted "policies [that] typically require employees to
acknowledge that their e-mail records are subject to inspection, monitoring, and public dis-
closure; that they have no right of privacy or any reasonable expectation of privacy in work-
place e-mails; that the e-mails are owned by the agency, not the employee; and that the e-
mails are presumptively considered to be public records" For example, the United States is
"a public employer that extensively uses "no confidentiality' policies with respect to its
workers. See Peter S. Kozinets, Access to the E-Mail Records of Public Officials: Safe-
guarding the Public's Right to Know, 25 COMMLAW 17, 23 (2007).
171 Brief of Petitioners, supra note 42, at 21; Id. at 65 ("As a matter of common sense,
senders should understand that communications with law enforcement agencies often in-
volve the reporting of crimes or emergencies.").
172 Transcript of Oral Arguments at 1, City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010)
(No. 08-1332), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oralarguments/argument transcripts/08-1332.pdf.
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communications expands.13 Chief Justice Roberts seemingly rebuked this
warning, expressing concern about leaving gaps in determining how to review
constitutional rights that attach to electronic communications.'74
Counsel for the Petitioners"' echoed the arguments set forth in the written
brief that they were of the belief that not only did Quon not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his text messages, but that additionally the search of
the text messages by the City was a reasonable one regardless of Quon's
Fourth Amendment concerns.'76 The first of those two prepositions consumed
most of the Justices' questions, honing the focus on the first prong of a Fourth
Amendment analysis."' Justice Ginsburg spent a majority of her time piecing
together many of the facts of the case so that a clear picture of Quon's under-
standing of the how the City's written policy and Duke's informal policy re-
lated to one another could be presented."' Throughout the oral arguments, it
became clear that the Court would indeed make the two step determination
based upon the facts: first, whether Quon had a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy; second, if Quon did have an expectation of privacy, whether the search
by the Department of the messages was reasonable. Petitioner's counsel fer-
vently argued that Quon should never have believed that his messages were
excluded from audit by the Department.'79 Pointing to the written formal policy
in conjunction with the meeting that was held explaining that the newly ac-
quired pagers fell within the restrictions set forth in the policy, it was argued
that Quon should have understood that the Department was within its discre-
tion to review any communication he sent on the pager.' In addition, the
City's counsel highlighted that the very nature of Quon's work should preclude
17 Id. at 21. (Acting Solicitor General Neal Katyal warned the Court that, "These tech-
nologies that are rapidly in flux, in which we don't have intuitive understandings the way
we do about, say trash and so on. And it's precisely that reason I think that the Court should
be very careful to constitutionalize and general Fourth Amendment rules in this area at the
first instance. To do so I think really does freeze... into place something that the legislature
can't then fix...); see also id. at 25. ("But what I think would be dangerous is to have a
blanker rule that constitutionalizes and says you always have reasonable expectations of
privacy in this technology").
174 Id. at 22.
's Id. at 2 (stating that the petitioners were represented by Kent L. Richland); GMSR:
Kent L. Richland, Partner, GMSR,
http://www.gmsr.com/attorneysprofile.cfm?id attorney=1008 (last visited Jan. 1, 2011)
(stating that Kent L. Richard is, a partner at the Los Angeles office of Greines, Martin, Stein
& Richland, LLP).
176 Transcript of Oral Arguments at 12, City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010)
(No. 08-1332), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral arguments/argument transcripts/08-1332.pdf.
'7 Id at 12-17.
178 Id. at 5.
"7 Id. at 3-17.
1 Id. at 3-7.
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any expectation of privacy in any communications he sent during his time on
the job,' a fact that was repeatedly pointed out by the lower courts.'82 They
also highlighted the briefs that were submitted to the Court by both petitioners
and amici."13 Lastly, although it was acknowledged that the Court would not be
reviewing any merits of Quon's contentions stemming from the Stored Com-
munications Act,'84 this did not eviscerate the issue from creeping up during
the Justices' questioning.' The Justices repeatedly asked City's counsel about
the effect that any violation of the Stored Communications Act would have had
on Quon's Fourth Amendment protections.'"' Counsel distilled the arguments
in the written brief down to one salient point, noting that even if the Stored
Communications Act had been violated, under the law articulated by the Court
in Virginia v. Moore, "the mere fact that something is contrary to the law does
not in itself permit a reasonable expectation of privacy,"' which seemed to
satisfy the Justices. The Acting Attorney General buttressed this assertion by
reiterating that even if the Act was hypothetically violated, it was the belief of
the United States government that the City could still prevail.'
Going further with the government's arguments, it was obvious that the
main concern centered on what the workability of work-place policies would
be, should the Court find that the informal policy put in place by Duke super-
81 Transcript of Oral Arguments at 6-7, City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010)
(No. 08-1332), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral arguments/argument transcripts/08-1332.pdf
(". . . [Quon] is using his department-issued pager; he is a police officers and indeed a
member of the high-profile SWAT team of the police department. He should be aware
just by virtue of the fact that there is going to be litigation involving incidents that the
SWAT team gets involved in where there will be requests for the communications that
are made on that official department-issued pager. And in addition, he should be aware
of the fact that...there may be inquiries from boards of police to determine whether the
conduct of the police in a particular incident is appropriate").
Id.
18 2 Quon 1, 445 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1116-41; Quon II, 529 F.3d at 896-907.
183 Brief of Petitioners, supra note 42, at 29; Brief of the League of California Cities and
California State Association of Counties, as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners City of
Ontario, Ontario Police Department, and Lloyd Scharf at 4-5, City of Ontario v. Quon, 130
S. Ct. 2619 (2010) (No. 08-1332).
184 Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010)
(No. 08-1332), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral arguments/argument-transcripts/08-1332.pdf
18 Id. at 16-20.
186 Id. at 8-9 (statement of Chief Justice Roberts). ("You would agree, I think, that if the
SCA, the Stored Communications Act, if that made it illegal to disclose these e-mails, then
he would certainly be correct that Quon has a reasonable expectation of privacy; isn't that
right?").
187 Id. at 8; See Brief of Petitioners, supra note 42, at iii-vi.
88 Transcript of Oral Argument at 8-9, 19-20, City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619
(2010) (No. 08-1332), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oralarguments/argument-transcripts/08-1332.pdf.
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seded the formal policy implemented by the Department.'89 It was the govern-
ment's contention that because a written policy was in place, its contents
should have provided the boundaries of an employee's expectation of privacy,
allowing for a workable standard in the workplace as well as one that could be
easily administered in the courts.'o As previously mentioned in this note, the
counsel went on to caution that the Court would not be prudent in making a
decision that would be binding for both employees and employers alike in an
area that is "rapidly in flux".' Indeed, the area of electronic communications
is so rapidly evolving that not all of the Justices fully understood how the de-
vices used by Quon and the rest of the Department actually worked.192 How-
ever, Justice Sotomayor, perhaps relying on her previous exposure to a related
case in the Second Circuit'93 , attempted to determine what effect a written pol-
icy has on the expectation of privacy of an employee.19 In essence, the Court
pondered the exact contention that the government was making.'95
Justices Breyer and Stevens reserved most of their questioning for the coun-
189 See id. at 28-31. Acting Attorney General Katyal stated,
Millions of employees today use technologies of their employers under policies estab-
lished by those employers. When a government employer has a no-privacy policy in
place that governs the use of those technologies, ad hoc statements by a non-policy
member cannon create a reasonable expectation of privacy. Put most simply, the com-
puter help desk cannon supplant the chief's desk. That simple, clear rule should have
decided this case.
Id. at 18.
190 Id. at 25-26.
191 Id. at 22.
192 Id. at 43-44. Chief Justice Roberts wondered if two messages were sent at the same
time would "one kind trump the other or does [a sender] get a busy signal?").
193 In 2001, Justice Sotomayor, while a federal judge for the Second Circuit, heard a case
that asked many of the same questions as those in Quon. In Leventhal v. Knapek, a Depart-
ment of Transportation employee asserted Fourth Amendment infringements when his em-
ployers searched a computer in his office after accusations of workplace-related violations.
Judge Sotomayor, writing for the three-judge panel, found that the employee had a reason-
able expectation of privacy in the contents of his computer because there was a complete
absence of a formal or informal policy that governed the use of the device. However, she
went on to quote Justice Scalia in O'Connor v. Ortega and found that the Department's
search of the computer was justifiable under the determination that the search was initiated
to determine if the employee had been violating work-place policy. In the present case, not
only has it been determined by the lower courts that the City's reason for searching Quon's
text message transcript was a reasonable one, it was undisputable that there were various
policies in place that governed the use of the pagers. Intuitively, in order for Justice So-
tomayor's decision to be consistent with her prior rulings, she would have to focus on the
"operational reality" of Quon's workplace and whether the informal agreement between
Quon and Duke trumps the formal policies that the City had in place. See generally Leven-
thal v. Knapek, 266 F.3d. 64, 64-74 (2d Cir. 2001); Quon 1, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 1123-1146.
194 Transcript of Oral Argument at 26-27, City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619
(2010) (No. 08-1332), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral arguments/argument-transcripts/08-1332.pdf.
1 Id. at 27.
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sel representing Quon and the other parties to his suit. Both were concerned
with the concept of the less intrusive means that had been so ardently argued
over in the lower courts and in the written briefs submitted to the Court."' Al-
though counsel for the respondents consistently argued with the Justices re-
garding the other means that could have been used to determine the nature of
the text messages, including asking an employee to consent to a review of the
text messages or asking the employee to black out the transcript where he felt
the messages were of a personal nature, both Justices were hesitant to agree
that any of the methods suggested would be practical in application.'" While
respondent's counsel was being questioned by the Court, Justice Scalia took
the opportunity to revisit the O'Connor case, where he had written a strong
dissent asserting that the Court should never look to the "operational work-
place reality" when analyzing an alleged Fourth Amendment violation in the
workplace.' Foreshadowing how the Court would ultimately rule, Justice
Scalia pointed out that, like in O'Connor,' a person could have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the their work desk, or even the text messages sent on
their employer issued device, but that the scope of the search of that individ-
ual's property could be reasonable and therefore withstand a Fourth Amend-
ment challenge. 200
B. The Court Renders a Narrow Decision
As legal scholars had noted,20' the Court was faced with a decision as to how
far it would go in the ruling in Quon. Academics and legal commentators alike
pondered whether the Court would tailor a holding to the specific facts in the
case or utilize the opportunity to make strides in the field of electronic com-
munications.202 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, answered these ques-
196 Id. at 33-39.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 26-27
99 O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
200 Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010)
(No. 08-1332), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument transcripts/08-1332.pdf.
201 See Orin Kerr, The Suprising Narrow Top-Side Merits Brief in City of Ontario v.
Quon, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 9, 2010, 7:29 PM),
http://volokh.com/2010/02/09/the-surprisingly-narrow-top-side-merits-brief-in-city-of-
ontano-v-quon.
202 See, e.g. Daniel 1. Prywes, Electronic Privacy and the Supreme Court, LAW.COM
(Feb. 9, 2010),
http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1202442982294&Elect
ronicPrivacyand the Supreme Court; Lisa Guerin, Supreme Court to Hear Text Message
Privacy Case, NOLO'S EMPLOYMENT LAW BLOG (Dec. 19, 2009),
http://www.employmentlegalblawg.com/2009/12/supreme-court-to-hear-text-mes.html;
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tions a mere three sentences in, stating that "[t]hough the case touches issues of
far reaching significance, the Court concludes it can be resolved by settled
principles determining when a search is reasonable."203 Those hoping that the
Court would promulgate new rules that would help lower courts analyze issue
relating to e-communications are left wanting204 , yet the opinion is not without
significance to that area of law.
In a unanimous decision, the Court found in favor of the City, and dismissed
all of the claims by Quon and the other parties to his suit.205 The Court reversed
the Ninth Circuit's ruling and found that an employer's search of a work-
issued device is permissible as long as it is not excessive in scope and reasona-
bly related to a work purpose, even if the employee had a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in those messages.206 Ultimately, they found that the Depart-
ment's search was reasonably related to the goal of determining the efficacy of
the character allotment that was given to the employees. The Court also deter-
mined that reviewing Quon's text message transcripts was not excessive.207
However, the Court refused to determine if Quon had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the messages he had sent, and instead "assumed" that he did for
purposes of their analysis.208 Yet, the Court subtly suggested that even in as-
suming some privacy in those messages, Quon would have been unreasonable
in assuming that all of the messages were exempt from any scrutiny.209 The
refusal to rule on whether Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy marks
reluctance by the judiciary to address privacy expectations in different forms of
electronic communications, for fear that they would create law in an area that
is not nearly settled.20 The Court specifically cited to the fact that Olmstead
was eventually overturned by Katz because the Court contemporaneous to
those rulings was not fully versed in the technologies that were implicated in
Lyle Denniston, Texting and Privacy on the Job, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 16, 2010, 3:25 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/04/texting-and-privacy-on-the-job/.
203 Quon III, 130 S. Ct. at 2624 (2010).
204 Id. at 2630 (Not wanting to address privacy implications that specifically attached to
Quon, Justice Kennedy wrote, "It is preferable to dispose of this case on narrower
grounds.")
205 Id. at 2633.
206 Id. at 2630, 2633.
207 Id. at 2633.
208 Quon III, 130 S. Ct. at 2630.
209 Id. at 2631 ("Even if [Quon] could assume some level of privacy would inhere in his
messages, it would not have been reasonable for Quon to conclude that his messages were in
all circumstances immune from scrutiny.").
210 Id. at 2629 ("The Court must proceed with care when considering the whole concept
of privacy expectations in communications made on electronic equipment owned by a gov-
ernment employer. The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amend-
ment implications of emerging technology before its role in society has become clear.").
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those specific searches.2 1 Instead, the Court proceeded under the assumption
that Quon possessed at least a minimal expectation of privacy in his messages,
and applied the standard articulated in O'Connor.2 2 In essence, the Court mim-
icked what the district court had determined at the first phase of the litigation,
ruling that "the search [by the Department] satisfied the standard of the
O'Connor plurality and was reasonable under that approach."213 Justice Scalia
balked at what he perceived was a "disregard of duty" by the Court's refusal to
address how expectations of privacy apply to electronic messages, and instead
making hypothetical assessments about Quon.214 Although he concurred in the
judgment, he scolded the Court for not facing the question of first impression
head on, and instead deferring the very important Fourth Amendment issues
that were in question in the case.215
The Court did, however, address the concept of the "operational realities"
and how it is intertwined with an individual's expectation of privacy. Although
the Court did not make a factual determination as to the operational reality at
the Department, it did acknowledge that when assessing the expectation of pri-
vacy an inquiry into the workplace environment would be called for."' This
assertion insures that the concept of the operational reality of a workplace is
safe and sound in its place in a Fourth Amendment analysis.
The Court also concluded that the Ninth Circuit improperly employed a
"less intrusive means" test when it dictated other hypothetical methods that the
Department could have used in attempting to determine the nature of Quon's
211 Id., see also Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (stating that the Court "con-
clude[ed] that the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by our
subsequent decisions that the 'trespass' doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded
as controlling").
212 Quon III, 130 S. Ct. at 2630. The Court noted:
Under the approach of the O'Connor plurality, when conducted for a 'noninvestigatory,
work-related purpose' or for the 'investigation of work-related misconduct,' a govern-
ment employer's warrantless search is reasonable if it is 'justified at its inception' and
if 'the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and is
not excessively intrusive in light of' the circumstances giving rise to the search.
Id.
213 Id.
214 Justice Scalia noted:
Applying the Fourth Amendment to new technologies may sometimes be difficult, but
when it is necessary to decide a case we have no choice. The Court's implication, ante,
at 10, that where electronic privacy is concerned we should decide less than we other-
wise would (that is, less than the principle of law necessary to resolve the case and
guide private action)-or that we should hedge our bets by concocting case-specific
standards or issuing opaque opinions-is in my view indefensible. The-times-they-are-
a-changin' is a feeble excuse for disregard of duty.
130 S. Ct. at 2635.
215 Quon III, 130 S. Ct. at 2634 (2010) (Scalia, A., concurring in part).
216 Id. at 2629.
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text messages.2 7 Citing the fact that it was contrary to controlling precedents
that have been issued by the judiciary, the Court stated that it has "repeatedly
refused to declare that only the 'least intrusive' search practicable can be rea-
sonably under the Fourth Amendment."2 8
The Court also agreed with both counsel for the City and the Acting Attor-
ney General,219 deciding that although a violation of the Stored Communica-
tions Act is not an inquiry for the Court, even if the Act had been violated, it
would not make the Department's search unreasonable and a violation of the
Fourth Amendment.220 The Court agreed with aforementioned counsel, citing
Supreme Court precedent that held that "the existence of a statutory protection
does not render a search per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment."22'
Lastly, the Court summarily dismissed the claims levied by those parties
who exchanged and received the text messages from Quon.222 In a mere six
sentences, the Court used the respondent's claim that because "the search was
unreasonable as to Sergeant Quon, it was also unreasonable as to his corre-
spondents" as the crux for their decision.223 Because the respondents never as-
serted that those who received messages from Quon could prevail in their suit
without Quon's doing so as well, the Court did not engage in a constitutional
analysis of their claims but simply dismissed their contention based on their
"litigating position."224
V. APPLICABILITY TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD
The outcome of the Quon case is set to have implications for all employers,
whether they are public or private.225 Establishing a more concise understand-
ing of the plurality opinion set forth in O'Connor would allow the holding to
apply to both the public and private sectors.226 If painted with a broad brush,
the ruling in the case will not only affect messages sent on a device similar to
the one issued by the OPD, but all electronic communication devices, includ-
ing computers, cell phones, Blackberries and any other instrument that conveys
217 Id. at 2632.
218 Id.
219 See discussion generally Part IV.A.
220 Quon III, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2632 (2010).
221 Id.
222 Id. at 2633.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Daniel I. Prywes, Electronic Privacy and the Supreme Court, LAW TECHNOLOGY
NEWS (Feb. 9, 2010),
http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1202442982294&Elect
ronicPrivacyand the SupremeCourt.
226 Id.
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messages.227 More specifically, the Court's assessment of both the concept of
the "operational reality" of the workplace and the negation of the debated "less
intrusive means test" is extremely relevant in the work sphere.228 In addition,
there are a host of public policy considerations that will be implicated by the
Supreme Court's ruling. The issue of whether taxpayer dollars are being util-
ized to maximize efficiency is an ever-growing concern in today's society and
economic times.229
Yet, the stark realization that comes through the words of Justice Kennedy is
that the current Court, minus Justice Scalia, does not believe that the time is
right to begin to delve deep into the constitutional privacy concerns of those
who employ electronic means of communication. Although the ruling is the
first step in what is sure to be a long litany of rulings that will develop the law
in this area, the Court's reluctance leaves the public wanting.
A. Operational Realities
At the heart of this case is the "reality" of the policy that governed the two-
way pager that Quon used to send and receive text messages. Respondents as-
serted that, taking into consideration all of the facts and circumstances, Quon
reasonably believed that his text messages would never be reviewed as long as
he continued to pay for any overage charges that he incurred.230 Conversely,
petitioners made the case that the exact opposite it true; that whatever informal
agreement that Quon had established with his colleagues regarding the pay-
ment of overages did not trump formal and written policy implemented by the
OPD that clearly stated that each user of the pagers was to operate under the
notion that anything sent or received on them was reviewable at any time.23 1
The petitioners also relied heavily on the implications of a 'public records
act"232 to establish that the reality of the situation that the respondent found
himself in was one that gave him no privacy protections in regards to this text
messages.233
Review of this concept has wide-ranging ramifications on both employers
and employees. By the Court stating that if they had decided to review Quon's
expectation of privacy they would have looked to the circumstances that cre-
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Chris Edwards, Empowering Citizens to Monitor Federal Spending, THE CATO INST.
(July 2006), www.cato.org/pubs/tbb/tbb 0718-38.pdf.
230 Brief of Respondents at 34-37, City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010) (No.
08-1332).
231 Brief of Petitioners, supra note 42, at 41.
232 Id. at 35.
233 Id at 35-37
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ated the operational reality of the work environment of the Department, the
Court implicitly keeps this concept alive. Employers around the country will
be forced to revisit their policies, both formal and informal, regarding the use
of provided devices. In a ruling such as this, the Court has established a stan-
dard that could allow informal policies, albeit even oral policies created by
non-policy makers, to trump formal agreements.234 This should signal to em-
ployers the need to implement strict policies and inform each and every em-
ployee that is involved with the enforcement of the policy to refrain from ac-
tivities that could be construed as creating a supplemental policy. In order to
protect their interests, it would behoove employers to give their employees full
notice and disclosure that their actions are being monitored and that in no way
can that assertion be overcome.
The ruling is not without benefits for the employer. By suggesting that
Quon, by way of working at a highly publicized SWAT team that consistently
works with the public, would have been remiss to believe that his messages
were completely exempt from review, those employers who function in a simi-
lar way to the Department could reasonably believe that their employees will
have a diminished expectation of privacy in their messages.
B. Deciding the "Less-Intrusive Means" Test
The Court would have been hard pressed to reach a decision unless it was
decided whether the Ninth Circuit employed a "less-intrusive means" test or if
the panel just suggested some methods which are "less intrusive" in passing.235
If nothing more, the Court's ruling will have a strong effect on how future
judges construct their opinions. Judge Wardlaw defended the Ninth Circuit's
"use" of the least intrusive means test by asserting that it wasn't really used as
a "test" but merely as way to illustrate examples of how the petitioners could
have rectified the situation with Quon without the non-consensual review of
his text messages.236 Judge Wardlaw went even further by suggesting that the
Ninth Circuit's opinion would not materially change if the words "less intru-
sive" never appeared in the ruling.237
Yet, petitioners relied on the court's use of this test to assert their main con-
tention for reversal.238 Neither side argued that the Supreme Court and various
circuit courts have found that the implementation of a less intrusive means test
234 Brief of the League of California Cities and California State Association of Counties,
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, City of Ontario, et al. at 2-3, 15; Quon III, 130 S.
Ct. 2619.
235 Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., 554 F.3d 769, 777 (9th Cir. 2009).
236 Id. at 773.
237 Id
238 Brief of Petitioners, supra note 42, at 45.
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is allowed, agreeing that precedent clearly dictates that the test should not be
utilized. Therefore, if the Court were to find that the Ninth Circuit did just that,
it would be potentially fatal to their case and would strongly suggest that future
courts avoid any type of rhetoric that resembles a similar standard. By finding
that the Ninth Circuit's ruling was inconsistent with both Court precedent and
sister circuits' rulings, the Court signals that the allowance of using language
that mirrors the litany of methods suggested by the lower court as a way of
infringing on employee's constitutionally protected privacy rights will not be
tolerated.
C. Public Policy Considerations
Technically, any device that is given to a government employee is paid for
by the individuals who pay taxes to the larger entity, the employer.239 There-
fore, the use of a device for non-work related purposes could be seen as a seri-
ous waste of taxpayer dollars. Although this does not go to the heart of the pri-
vacy rights issue debated, it is not something that should be overlooked. Indi-
vidual taxpayers place their trust in government officials, even more so when it
is a person that works in law enforcement. Taxpayers want to be reassured that
government employees are working to the best of their ability and that time
and money is not being wasted. This desire is heightened when applied to law
enforcement. The primary task of a person who is in the employ of government
law enforcement, like the City of Ontario's SWAT team, is to make sure that
each citizen is secure and safe. It can hardly be said that an individual who is
sending upwards of one hundred text messages a day while on duty is abiding
by the standard. The only method by which an individual who is not in a su-
pervisory role could determine if a law officer (or any other government em-
ployee) is making efficient use of taxpayer's dollars would be to request
documents that could show how an employee uses his time. In this case, if a
member of the City of Ontario community made the decision to request tran-
scripts of text messages sent by SWAT team members while on active duty, he
or she would only be able to receive these documents as long as the sender's
privacy rights were not being infringed. The restriction of the ability to review
text message transcripts could be seen as enabling the waste of taxpayer dol-
lars.
In the converse, today more than ever, people are afraid of the wide latitude
that the government has to access personal information.240 By the Court finding
239 Brief of the League of California Cities and California State Association of Counties,
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners City of Ontario, et al. at 2-3, 15, City of Ontario v.
Quon 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010) (No. 08-1332).
240 John W. Whitehead, The State of the Nation: I Am Afraid, THE HUFFINGTON POST
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in favor of the petitioner, it gave the government and other employers another
quiver in their bow by which to review information that is not readily accessi-
ble. Stretching farther than the realm of the government, there is a constant
tension between the employer and the employee in any sector of the workforce.
It is the employer's job to ensure that employees are utilizing their time in the
most efficient manner that will be beneficial to the principal, which can be a
trying task in today's society where technology makes it easier for an em-
ployee to engage in non-work related activities while at the office. The em-
ployee, on the other hand, wishes to be free from employer's constant review
of each and every action that he or she takes while at the workplace. The ruling
in this case, no matter from which side one looks at it, will affect the schematic
of how much an employer can monitor an employee's actions on any of the
various communication devices that, in modem times, are integral to almost
any office.
VI. CONCLUSION
The ruling in Quon v. City of Ontario is one of the first in what will be a
long history of cases that focus on the dynamic between employer, employee,
and the information that the latter chooses to exchange vis-A-vis an employer-
issued device. The Court's hesitation to address how constitutional protections
formally attach to such exchanges ensures that a future Court will hear many of
the same arguments addressed during Quon. As the workplace inches forward
through the technological age, it is only logical that those very arguments will
not fade into the background. As with most technology, only time can expose
the advantages and disadvantages each new device brings to the public. With
the advent of the majority of employers issuing communication devices to aid
in the efficiency of an office, clearly defining the legal boundaries that govern
the use of the device will be beneficial to both employer and employee alike.
(Jan. 19, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-w-whitehead/the-state-of-the-nation-
e b_426970.html.
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